Exploited Vulnerabilities

Check Point zero-day CVE-2026-123039: how PHP2Shell and a root socket opened firewall gateways

Check Point zero-day CVE-2026-123039 was chained with PHP2Shell to get root on Mobile Access gateways. The attack chain, why it worked and how to check.

By · · 6 min read

The Check Point zero-day CVE-2026-123039 is a local privilege escalation in the Gaia OS DynamicCLI service, and attackers exploited it in the wild by chaining it with PHP2Shell on internet-facing Mobile Access portals. Check Point disclosed the activity on 12 November 2026, and CISA added CVE-2026-123039 to its Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog on 13 November.

According to Check Point, exploitation ran from 30 October to 4 November and compromised “a couple of dozen” unpatched systems, all in a single region. The fix for the initial access bug had been available since 23 October. In a limited number of cases the intrusions ended with a wiper on a VMware ESXi host.

What happened

Check Point lists two pieces in the chain:

CVE What it is CVSS Affected
CVE-2026-109618, CVE-2026-109619 (PHP2Shell) Unauthenticated remote code execution via firewall web interfaces 9.2 Security Gateways with Mobile Access Portal, R80 to R82.20, plus listed Spark versions
CVE-2026-123039 Local privilege escalation in the Gaia OS Dynamic CLI service 7.8 Gaia R81.20, R82, R82.10, R82.20

PHP2Shell is a vulnerability in PHP itself that also affects Check Point gateways. CVE-2026-123039 is Check Point’s own bug. As quoted by BleepingComputer, the advisory says the DynamicCLI daemon “runs as root and listens on a world-writable local socket (/tmp/dynamic_socket) without authenticating connecting processes”, so any local user can have commands executed as root.

The November Jumbo Hotfix fixes both, along with CVE-2026-107484 (Gaia Portal privilege escalation) and CVE-2026-120490 (management-to-gateway access via a NAT rule), which Check Point says were not exploited.

The attack chain, step by step

Based on Check Point Research’s write-up:

  1. Initial access through PHP2Shell. From 30 October, traffic from 130.94.19[.]204 hit vulnerable Mobile Access portals. The exploitation left PHP session files containing the marker upload_progress_pwn under /opt/CPcvpn-R81.20/tmp/ and caused hundreds of segmentation faults in the portal’s Apache/PHP workers.
  2. From portal account to root. Code running as the portal service account talked to the DynamicCLI socket and ran commands as root (CVE-2026-123039).
  3. Webshells in the login templates. As root, the attackers wrote PHP webshells as zz*.tpl files into the directory the portal uses to build its login pages. The larger shell requires a hardcoded key and supports command execution, PHP evaluation and file upload.
  4. A dedicated gateway backdoor. They launched TSGA as /tmp/CPconfigdaemon, which relaunches itself as slot_CPconfigdaemon in the boot persistence directory and drops TSProxy as /lib/libcpfwcommon.so. TSProxy is injected into appliance processes to handle marked attacker connections inside normal traffic. TSGA also supports configuration theft, backup and snapshot persistence and firewall-log tampering.
  5. Internal discovery. The gogo scanner was deployed on the gateway to map internal assets.
  6. Pivot to the hypervisor. The attackers moved over SSH to a VMware ESXi host using the vpxuser service account.
  7. Destruction. On ESXi they ran the destroy_v6 wiper and left a DREAM_ANNEXATION.txt note that explicitly rejects ransom negotiations.

The first wave on 30 October targeted Israeli organisations and included the destructive activity. A second scanning wave on 2 November reached organisations in several countries, with no evidence of destruction. Check Point links TSGA and TSProxy to PhiliKit, a toolset previously seen against Ivanti appliances and associated by ESET with the China-nexus group UNC5221, but says it cannot assess the operation’s true nature with high confidence. A false flag or an access broker handing off to someone else both remain possible.

Why it worked

The patch window was a week, and a week was enough. The PHP2Shell hotfix shipped on 23 October. Exploitation began on 30 October. For an internet-facing VPN portal, seven days between fix and mass exploitation is now normal, not an outlier.

A root daemon trusted anyone who could reach its socket. A world-writable socket in /tmp with no caller authentication turns any foothold on the box into root. On an appliance, the web portal is exactly the kind of low-privilege process an attacker lands in first.

The firewall had a path to the hypervisor. The gateway could open SSH to ESXi with a valid service account. Security appliances often sit on management networks with broad reach, and that reach becomes the attacker’s once the appliance is owned.

Appliance logs were part of the target. TSGA can tamper with binary firewall logs, and Check Point lists unexplained gaps in traffic logs as an indicator. If your only evidence lives on the compromised device, you may not have evidence.

What defenders should do

  • Install the November Jumbo Hotfix on every Management Server and Security Gateway, starting with internet-facing Mobile Access deployments.
  • If you cannot patch yet, BleepingComputer reports that Check Point’s temporary mitigation is to stop the dynamic_server process and prevent it from restarting. Treat that as a stopgap only.
  • Hunt, do not just patch. Exploitation predates the disclosure by about two weeks. A patched gateway can still carry a backdoor installed on 30 October.
  • Restrict what gateways can reach. The firewall should not have SSH to ESXi or vCenter service accounts. Put hypervisor management behind its own access path.
  • Ship appliance logs off the box to a SIEM in near real time, so log tampering on the device does not erase your record.
  • Reduce the exposed portal surface. If Mobile Access is not used, disable it. If it is, keep it on a patch SLA measured in days.

How to check if you are affected

  • Version and blade: Gaia R81.20, R82, R82.10 or R82.20 without the November Jumbo Hotfix is vulnerable to CVE-2026-123039. Any gateway from R80 to R82.20 with the Mobile Access Portal exposed and without the PHP2Shell fix was open to initial access.
  • Network IOCs: connections from 130.94.19[.]204 or 130.94.19[.]168.
  • Files: PHP session files containing upload_progress_pwn; zz*.tpl files in the portal template directory; /tmp/CPconfigdaemon, /tmp/.bd.log, /tmp/.up.tpl, /lib/libcpfwcommon.so, a process named slot_CPconfigdaemon; scanner or wiper files under /tmp.
  • Behaviour: listeners on TCP port 11072 or the Unix socket /tmp/.p_sock; DynamicCLI commands that did not go through the default Clish wrapper, or use of the system() sink; a crash of the logging daemon followed by gaps in traffic logs.
  • Hashes: Check Point Research publishes SHA-256 hashes for the webshell, TSGA, gogo, the wiper and the note in its report.

Check Point notes that the absence of a match does not rule out compromise. If you find any of these, treat the gateway and everything it could reach over SSH as compromised, and rotate credentials stored on or used by it.

My take

This is the same lesson as every edge-device campaign of the last few years: the device that enforces trust is the one most worth owning, and it is usually the least observed. What stands out here is how ordinary the escalation was. No exotic kernel bug, just a root daemon listening on a world-writable socket.

It also fits a pattern I wrote about in the Cursor supply chain breach: attackers rarely need one brilliant bug when they can chain small trust assumptions. For more cases like this, see the exploited vulnerabilities category.

Three questions for this week: which of our VPN and firewall portals are exposed, how many days did each take to get the 23 October hotfix, and could any of those appliances open a session to our hypervisors?

Sources

  1. Security Advisory: Active Exploitation of PHP2Shell and Local Privilege Escalation · Check Point, 12 November 2026
  2. PHP2Shell Exploitation on Check Point Gateway · Check Point Research, 12 November 2026
  3. sk1000362: CVE-2026-123039, local privilege escalation to root in the DynamicCLI process · Check Point Support
  4. CISA Adds Two Known Exploited Vulnerabilities to Catalog · CISA, 13 November 2026
  5. Check Point security advisory (AV26-1154), Update 1 · Canadian Centre for Cyber Security, 13 November 2026
  6. Check Point warns of zero-day flaw exploited for root access · BleepingComputer, 13 November 2026
  • check-point
  • cve-2026-123039
  • php2shell
  • cve-2026-109618
  • cve-2026-109619
  • gaia-os
  • mobile-access
  • edge-devices
  • wiper